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"Demographics  is one of the most researched
subjects in the  investment community.  It's
a very hot topic."  (Crudele, 1989)
Who you are,  and what you aspire to be, determines a large part of
what you eat.  As  a nation, we are becoming increasingly diverse.  There
are more and more people of different colors, different nationalities,
different lifestyles, and different tastes  than ever before.
Demographics grow in importance  for determining how much and what
types of food are  consumed as  population growth rates  slow and the
composition of the population changes.  As we become more affluent, food
commands  a smaller and smaller portion of household income.  For  example,
in 1987,  the average U.S. household spent only 9% of its  income for food
eaten at home;  13%  for all  food (USDL, 1987).  As the proportion of
income needed for food falls,  consumers become less concerned with food
prices and more concerned with taste,  convenience, variety, status and
healthfulness.  As markets grow more competitive, projecting retail sales
on the basis of prices and income, though important,  is not enough;  it
ignores critical changes  in age, household structure and lifestyle that
affect consumer behavior  (Myers, 1987).
The demographic composition of the past and current population is
well known and can be projected out ten or twenty years with reasonable
accuracy  (Conner, 1989).  Beyond that, statements about population change
are  largely speculative, based on the  assumption that past trends will
continue.  However, compared to  other exogenous forces affecting the
demand and supply of food (weather, wars, pests, government policies,
1inflation) the  influence of demographics  is relatively predictable.  One
can debate which changes are most important and more enduring, but a
growing proportion of non-whites,  elderly, highly educated workers and
working women are  typically credited with leading the biggest changes in
the way we live and eat.
The direction of demographic trends and their likely influence on
food consumption  is explored in this paper.  Topics  covered are population
growth and composition, ethnic  diversity, household composition of
families and nonfamilies, aging, regional, educational and  income trends
and char.ges  in lifestyle that have come about because of new patterns of
labor  force participation.  The  impact that each of these  demographic
trends has on food consumption and demand is discussed within each section
and summarized at  the end.  This  analysis will show that markets, as well
as people, are  increasingly diverse.  A mass market for generic  food
commodities may be a thing of the past.
POPULATION GROWTH
In 1990 the United States population of  250 million people was
growing at half  the  rate it was  in the middle of the  twentieth century.
An average growth rate of 1.3% per year led the  total population to
increase by 80%  over the  30 years prior to  1980.  Population is  expected
to  increase by only 15%  in the  30 years following 1980.  Population will
grow  less than 2 per 1000 or 0.2%  per year (Spencer, 1986).  European
growth rates are already  down to 0.3%  per year, while global growth rates
are 1.7% with  the highest rates in Africa (3%),  Latin America (2%)  and
South Asia  (1.9%)  (Stover, 1989).
2Growth rates  in the United States are quite uneven across ethnic
groups.  Nonhispanic whites increased at a rate of five per 1000
population in 1990.  Hispanics and other races  (except blacks) increased
at a rate of 27  per 1000;  blacks at a rate of 15  per 1000.  By 2010, these
rates will be  1.5 per 1000 for whites, 18  for Hispanics and 11 for blacks.
By 2030, the population growth rate for whites  is projected to be negative
(-2 per 1000)  (Spencer, 1986).
Figure 3.1  illustrates the slowing of the overall population growth
and the change  in the mix of ethnic groups using the middle level
population projections  of the Census Bureau (USDC, P25-No.  952,  1984 and
Spencer, 1986).  The proportion of the total that  is nonwhite  (the space
between the top and bottom line) continues to  increase throughout the time
illustrated.  Population growth is projected to taper off for all ethnic
groups by about 2030.  This  leads  to  the question of how economic sectors
and industries such as  the food industry, designed to  thrive on growing
markets, will adjust.
The slowing of domestic population growth means  that growth in the
quantity of food demanded in the United States and the rest of the
developed world will also  decrease.  Most Americans are already eating as
much food as  they can and many, more than they should.  Over one-quarter
of adults  are considered obese and 56%  report dieting to  loose weight
(Schlosberg, 1987).  Food vendors face increased competition for a share
of each consumer's  stomach, while the number of stomachs  is  increasing at
a slower pace  (Kinsey, 1987).
Population growth has traditionally depended upon fertility rates,
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4~~~~~~~~~~~~m~rdeclining mortality, continued immigration, and the fertility of nonwhite
women.  The demand for food  in the future will depend less on population
growth and more on a diversity of consumer's preferences stemming from a
growing variety of ethnic and cultural backgrounds,  lifestyles, and aging
needs.  "As American consumers grow more educated and diverse and demand
increasingly customized service, the future will belong to  those who
target local differences  cost-effectively"  (Edmondson, 1988,  p.2 6 .).
ETHNIC DIVERSITY
"People eat what they can get  from
the environment, and, given a
chance, they will eat what their
forbearers ate"(Gibson,  1981)1
The faces and places of immigration have changed dramatically over
the past century.  Figure 3.2 illustrates  these changes.  Initially,
Northern and Western Europeans settled in the American Northeast and West.
By 1921,  they comprised only 41%  of the immigrants, with Southern and
Eastern Europeans increasingly migrating to  the Northeastern U.S.  The
1965  Immigration Act abolished national origin quotas opening up the
borders to  unprecedented numbers  of Asians and Hispanics.  By 1986,  all
Europeans comprised less than 15%  of immigrants;  41% were Asian and 37%
were Latin American.  These new immigrants moved into  the South, West and
Midatlantic  states  (Batson, 12/6/87).
Immigration accounted for 28%  of the population growth in the late
1980s and by 2030, will account for all the growth if births rates do not
change  (Batson, 1987).  Immigration continues largely unchecked in the
1 This  quote was altered to use  gender neutral  language.
5U,  -. ~~~~~.
,42
ch c~$~ 
cn  c  m  rz  3jn
E  P  jE
mm  w
UO)  V)  c~  o 
En  0
c~(  LKu  ~  L
0  .
m  U~~
E  0  Sr'.
S  ~~  E
64
EY  E  co
~Q,  E  r00  0  0  u  E  Co
16  Cm  E ;C  5 
II  ~  ~  a,  7E  a  c
'E Z  C  E .2 
~~~O  C1~~~~~C
E  w  Cm' Ir  c~~~~~~~~E  ~  m~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
E  Co  cn
M  GI
a)  Pz  A2  -EC;  Eb
Q  J
F,  (  ~ . yr)  S  '  e  ·United States where  5% of the world's population takes in 50% of the
international migrants, not counting refugees and illegal immigrants each
year  (Young, 1986).  In the past two decades, over three fourths of  the
legal  immigrants have come  from third world countries, principally from
Mexico, West  Indies, Cuba, Korea and the Philippines.  About one-fourth of
the increase  in Hispanics since 1980  is attributed to illegal  immigrants
(Schwartz, 1988).  The  actual number of illegal immigrants in the United
States  is not known, but Census Bureau estimates  imply that the difference
between legal and illegal immigrants  is  about 38,000 people per year
(Exter, -987).  Estimates of the total number of illegal immigrants  in  the
United States  ranges, however,  from one  to  12 million (Young, 1986).
Ethnic Diversity and Immigration
Diversity in the market will be ensured by continued immigration.
The average American will look, behave and eat differently  in the next
century.  In the  Southwest, Hispanics now outnumber blacks.  Hispanics
comprise at least one-fourth of the population  in Texas and over one-third
of  California;  they are  the majority in New Mexico.  Hispanics are
relatively young with about one-third under the  age of  15;  63% have
Mexican roots.  Mexican Hispanics are not only the largest group of
immigrants,  they have the highest fertility rates of all ethnic  groups
(2.8 per adult woman's lifetime)  (Spencer, 1986).
In 1989,  Hispanics comprised over 8% of the population, a 39%
increase  in nine years.  Half of the  increase was  due to  immigration
(USDC,CB89-158, 10/12/89).  Between now and 2010, half of the  total
population growth will be due to  increasing numbers of Hispanics  (Exter,
71987).  The white population will decline from 87%  in 1960  to about 69%  in
2005.
Integration of an immigrant group  into our society normally takes
about 3 generations;  Hispanics have awhile  to go.  They are largely
Spanish speaking;  they practice Catholicism, male dominance and have  few
inter-racial marriages  (Young, 1986).  Their large numbers  and
concentration  in the Southwest have imposed changes on the local
lifestyle, including the language in which business  is conducted.  They
register to vote  in greater proportions  (81%)  than the rest  of the
population (70%),  but they are split in their alignment with political
parties.  Almost two thirds of the Cubans report being Republican, while
42% of the Mexican Americans report being Democrats  (Minneapolis Star and
Tribune, September 8, 1989).  On the other hand, many Hispanic  immigrants
take several years  to become citizens,  and are unable to vote at all.
This  is  only one  indication of large diversity among Hispanic people.
Though most are  still relatively poor  (21.3 in poverty  [Batson, 1987])  and
undereducated (49% have not completed high school  [USDC, CB88-142,
1988]),  the rate  of college education among Cubans  is ahead of that for
the nation as a whole  (25%  vs. 20%)  (Schwartz, 1988).  The 1987 median
income of Cubans was $1,304 more than the national median household
income, and 1.4 times  as much as  the median Hispanic's income of $19,305
(USDC, CB88-148,  1988).  Figure 3.3  shows  the distribution of Hispanics  in
the United States and their median incomes  in 1987.
Immigrants typically provide a low wage labor pool  that U.S.
consumers and businesses  (though not laborers) have historically welcomed.
This has been particularly true for farm labor and in the food service
8Figure  3.3 Percentage of Hispanic Persons In the United States  By Place of
Origin and Median Income  in 1987.
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Sources:  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the  Census, NEWSL CB87-
114,  9/11/87 and NEWS, CB88-142,  9/7/88.
9industry.  In countries  like the United States where  indigenous
population growth has virtually stopped, immigrants provide a way to
continue economic  growth by creating jobs and decreasing the dependency
ratio caused by an aging population.  Simon  (1989) argues  that immigrants
work harder, save more and are more  innovative  than native Americans and
that  their numbers ought  to be  increased to help foster economic
innovation and growth.
Third world immigrants, however, typically lack skills, education,
and financial resources.  Only 10% enter with a profession and 5% with a
craft  (Young,  1986).  These immigrants  swell the  ranks of low income
households and the need for  low priced consumer goods, especially food and
housing.  A view opposite that of Simon (1989)  is that although a large
supply of  low wage labor may  increase the competitiveness of U.S.
industries in world markets  in the short run,  it ultimately reduces
incentives for U.S. businesses  to adopt new, more productive and
competitive technology.  In the countries  from which the immigrants flee,
the chances for economic reform are also  diminished.  Pressure to  decrease
fertility declines and incentives  for income  redistribution and
opportunities diminish as migrants leave their home country for higher
wages elsewhere.
Ethnic diversity, over the next half century will  increase the
diversity of  types of consumer goods that will be demanded and also change
the complexion of the schools and the labor market.  Nonwhites are
relatively young, meaning that they will be found in disproportionate
numbers in schools, entry level jobs, and maternity wards.  In 1985  the
median age of blacks was  26.3,  for Hispanics 25,  and for whites  32.2
10(Minneapolis Star and Tribune, April 11,  1985).  Twenty years from now,
almost 40%  of children in grades 1-8 will be nonwhite compared to  31%
today.  (The nonwhite count includes  all Hispanics, about half of whom are
white  [Riche,  1988]).  "Minority" children will be the "majority" of
children in 6 states  (NM, CA, TX, NY, FL, LA,)  and Washington D.C. by 2010
(Schwartz & Exter, 1989).  Those states where less than 20%  of youth will
be nonwhite in 2010 lie mostly along the northern border.  Figure 3.4
shows  those states where over 80%  of children will be white and those
where a majority of children will be nonwhite by 2010  (Riche, 1988).
The mix of faces in American schools and work places is  changing
fast.  It means that the  faces  in the supermarkets  and restaurants will be
changing in the future.  The challenge to food marketers  is  to anticipate
increasingly diverse needs and changing preferences.  Relative to whites,
nonwhites were found to eat  fewer fruits and vegetables,  though more dark
green vegetables.  They were less likely than whites  to drink milk or eat
milk products, butter, margarine, beef or deserts.  They were more  likely
to  consume  rice, legumes, pork, fish, poultry, eggs and sweet beverages
(Cronin et  al,  1982).  This pattern, it  turns out, is  quite  consistent
with trends in per capita food consumption, the topic of another chapter.
Blacks were  found to spend an average of $1000 per year less on food
than whites, a reflection of their generally lower  incomes.  They also
spend a smaller percent of their food budget eating away from home,  that
is,.21% compared to  33%  for the rest of the nation (Pitts,  1989).  In the
early 1980s,  blacks spent  10% more than the average on meats, fish and
eggs and 30% more on fish and poultry, even though they spent less on food
overall  (Blaylock and Smallwood, 1986).
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n~~~~~~~~1Apparently some Hispanics prefer high fat milk.  A specialty market
for milk with a 3.8 verses 3.5% butter fat  (whole milk) has developed in
Hispanic sections of New York City, while the rest of the nation is  moving
to lower fat milk products  (Deveny, 1989).  This  is an illustration of how
ethnic diversity drives food demand and market niches that develop.
Others are  created by strong cultural  and religious beliefs about food.
For example, Jewish needs for Kosher food, Indian taboos on beef and
American taboos on eating animals used for pets,  influence demand in local
markets.
Ethnic groups not only increase  the diversity of foods demanded, but
they  introduce new foods  into the American diet by selling them to the
larger population.  Asian Americans were more likely than other minority
groups to own their own businesses, with Chinese and Japanese owning 40%
of the  225,642 firms owned by Asians.  Most of these are in a retail
trade, with one quarter of the total receipts  ($18 billion per year)
coming from food stores or eating and drinking places  (USDC, CB86-195,
1986).
Consumers  from all ethnic backgrounds are becoming cosmopolitan
eaters.  Between 1982 and 1986,  the traffic in Asian restaurants increased
54%.  It increased 43%  in Mexican restaurants and 26%  in Italian
restaurants, compared to 10%  overall.  Chinese restaurants are found
universally.  Mexican restaurants are spreading across  the country from
the Southwest, while  the bulk of Italian restaurants are in the Northeast
(Zelinsky 1987).
13REGIONAL DIFFERENCES
Regional differences  revolve around demographics, ethnic cultures,
population growth and  income  trends.  Population gains were the greatest
in the South and West in 1980 and 1990  (16  and 21% respectively).  They
are expected to  grow by another 11  and 13%  respectively by 2000.  The
Northeast grew about 3%,  and the Midwest gained 1.5%.  By 2000, however,
the growth  in the Northeast will be only 2.4%,  and it will decline 0.3%  in
the Midwest (USDC, CB88-48, 1988).  The population continues to  shift  to
the South and West.  States  that gained the most between 1980 and 1990 are
New Hampshire  (24%),  Florida  (31.5%),  Texas  (24.5%),  Arizona (38%),  Nevada
(34%),  Arkansas  (43%),  and New Mexico  (25%).  States that  lost population
during that  time are Pennsylvania (-.3%),  Ohio  (-0.1%),  Iowa  (-5.3%),  West
Virginia (-4.8%)  and the area of Washington D.C.  (-3.8%).  Many of the
North Central states are expected to  loose population by 2000  (USCD, CB88-
48,  1988),  though there  is  some evidence  that they may be holding their
own or starting to grow (USDC, CB88-205, 1988).
We are a rather mobile society.  About 18%  of the population or 43.7
million people move each year;  most people move within the same county.
Three percent, or  7.5 million people, move across a state line.  Thirty-
five percent of people  in their early twenties move around the nation each
year  (USDC, CB89-77,  1989).  They leave home  to  go to college or  to  find
jobs, mostly in nearby suburban neighborhoods.  We continue to migrate
from rural to  urban centers.  Almost half of the people in the United
States  lived in metropolitan areas of 1 million or more, and three-
fourths  lived in areas designated as metropolitan  in 1988  (USDC, CB88-157,
1988).  Those who lived on farms  comprised 2% of the population in 1987
14(USDC, CB88-119, 1988).  Rural-nonfarm people made up the other 23%  of  the
population.  Mobility helps to  introduce a variety of food preferences
across  the country, but differences  in food tastes and types persist
between regions.  Urbanization increases the number of meals eaten away
from home, projected to be at  least 50%  of all meals in the 1980s
(National Restaurant Association, 1978).
Hispanics,  the most rapidly growing ethnic culture,  live mainly in
the Southwest.  In  1989,  34%  of the Hispanics lived in California, 21%  in
Texas and 10%  in New York.  Florida and New Mexico each had 8% and the
rest wer'  scattered throughout the United States  (USDC, CB89-158,  1989).
American Indians, who numbered about 1.4 million, were heavily
concentrated in New Mexico, Arizona, South Dakota and Oklahoma.  About
two-thirds  of them did not live on Indian Reservation Land  (USDC, CB84-
184,  1984).  Indians and Hispanics are relatively poor and undereducated.
Their food needs will be reflected in the demand for low cost, basic foods
that are consistent with their taste preferences.
There were at  least 25  different Asian and Pacific Island groups  that
made up the 3.5 million Asian American population.  Although they
comprised 1.6%  of the  total population, they were 5% of the population in
the West during the 1980s.  Ninety percent of this Asian American
population was  comprised of (in descending order) Chinese,  Filipino,
Japanese, Asian Indian, Korean, Vietnamese, Laotian and Thai.  Over 20%
lived in California, Hawaii or New York.  Other states that had large
numbers of Asian Americans were New Jersey, Texas  (Vietnamese), Illinois
(Laotians),  Washington (Cambodians), and Minnesota (Hmong and Laotian)
(USDC, CB84-02,  1984).
15The proportion of blacks living in the South increased since 1980 to
56%  from 52%, while their proportion in the Northeast declined.  This
reversal  in a long trend for blacks  to leave  the South is  expected to
continue  (USDC, CB90-07,  1/10/90).
There are some differences  in the age distribution by region.  Those
counties that had the highest percentage of people under the age of 5 in
1988 were located mostly in the Western Mountain states  (Utah, Wyoming,
Idaho, New Mexico and Texas)  (USDC,CB88-176, 1988).  Five other  states had
37%  of all  the preschoolers  (California, Texas, New York, Illinois and
Florica)  (Wall Street Journal, 12/15/88).  Referring back to  Figure  3.4,
one  can see that, except  for Illinois, these  are among the states where
minority children will be the majority by 2010.  Those counties with the
highest percent of people over the  age of 65 were located mostly in
Florida, with some in Texas and Arizona  (USCD, CB88-176,  1988).
Other regional  differences may also affect food consumption.  For
example,  the counties with the highest unemployment rates were in the
South, but those with the lowest per capita income were mostly  in the
Midwestern Plains  (Nebraska,  North Dakota, South Dakota and Montana).
Both lead to poorer households and demand for lower cost foods.  In
contrast, 15 out  of the  25  counties with the highest per capita incomes
were  in a corridor from  Washington D.C.  to north of New York (USDC, CB88-
176,  1988).  The Boston - Washington D.C. corridor also had one sixth of
the total U.S.  population and one fourth of its metropolitan population
(USDC, CB89-95,  1989).  Except for San Francisco, it  also had the  six
most densely populated metropolitan areas, and was the largest continuous
urban area  in the country (USDC,CB88-176, 1988).  It is  largely
16responsible for the fact that half of the population  lived in the Eastern
time zone, while only 15%  of the population lived in the Pacific  time zone
(USDC, CB84-84, 1984;  Myers).  This east coast area is very urban,
cosmopolitan and relatively wealthy.  Food choices here reflect a wide
variety of tastes  consistent with high incomes and fast-paced lives.  It
sets many of the food trends  for high income households across  the
country.  It contains pockets of wealthy households that made up the
quintessential yuppie market of the  late 1980s.
Regionality and ethnicity contribute not only to homogeneous and
tenacious  consumption patterns among people within an area, but to
diversity between areas as  well  (Gibson, 1981).  In the Southwest, demand
has been relatively high for  fruits, vegetables and fish, but low for
butter and cheese.  Southerners reported eating less fruit and fewer dairy
products, while eating more dried beans and peas, quick breads and more
meat, fish, poultry and eggs than the rest of the nation (Cronin et.  al.,
1982).  Those  in the North Central or Northeast regions were more likely
to  eat desserts;  snack food was more prevalent in the North Central  region
(Cronin, et al.,  1982).  People in the West and the Northeast spent more
on fruits and vegetables, cereals, bakery and dairy products as well as
food away from home.  In the Northeast more was spent on poultry, meat,
fish and eggs.  In the West, more was spent on prepared foods  (Blaylock
and Smallwood, 1986).  This  is consistent with the Northeast's  and West's
relatively urban, dense populations, high incomes and concomitant demand
for convenience.
17HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION
Household composition is  the foundation of demographic trends.  Its
most important components  are household size,  age distribution and marital
status.  The general trend in American households has been towards
smaller, older households with fewer married couples and fewer children.
Fewer children are a result of declining fertility rates,  rates that vary
considerably by ethnic group.
Fertility
As early as  the  1920s,  the fertility rate began to  drop among
European and American women.  By the  1960s,  the idea of zero population
growth became a popular cause among those concerned with preserving an
ecological balance and preventing the Malthusian (mass starvation)
hypothesis from coming true.  Among the Northern European countries and
the white population of the United States, zero population growth has been
a reality since at least 1972  (Young, 1986).  That  is,  the  total fertility
rate  in these populations has been less  than 2.1 children per adult woman
over her lifetime.  The French and other European nations have tried
various ways  to  curtail "denatalite"  in order to stimulate economic growth
(Tomlinson, 1984).  In the United States, fertility has been falling in
all age groups since the end of the baby boom in 1964.  Figure 3.5  shows
the average fertility patterns of American women since 1940.  The  only
recent upward trend has been among women age  31-40 in the late 1980s.
This has been called a baby "echo" and is not expected to continue.
Fertility rates  among blacks,  at 82.2 births per 1000 women age  15-
44 in 1985,  were 35%  higher than for whites  (USDHHS, PHS 88-1123,  1988).
18Figure  3.5
Fertility  Rates: 1940-1985
(by  age  group  of mother)








1940  1945  1950  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985
year
10-14  yr  16-19  yr  20-24  yr - 25-30  yr
--  31-34  yr  -3  35-40  yr  41-44  yr  z  45-49  yr
Source:  U.S.  Statistical Abstract-
1989,  (1988)
19Hispanic fertility rates were  50% higher than whites' and 9% higher  than
blacks'.  Fertility among foreign born women was  99 per 1000 women in
1986,  compared to  68  for native born American women, and 54  for European
women (USDC, CB88-04, 1988)  Even so,  in 1990 the number of white births
in the United States  (2,629,000) was  over five times  the number of
Hispanic births,  four times  the number of black births and 22  times the
number of births  among other races  (Spencer, 1986).
Fertility rates  are largely a function of culture, health, income,
and the availability of effective contraception.  Fertility rates fell
among both blacks  and whites by almost the  same percentage  (47% and 44%,
respectively) between 1960 and 1985  (USDHHS, PHHS88-1123, 1988).  It could
hardly be a coincidence that the baby boom ended shortly after  "the pill"
first appeared on the American scene.In 1982,  the percent of blacks and
whites who were surgically sterile was very similar, 22%  and 26%,
respectively.  Those reporting regular use  of contraceptives was another
36%  and 37%,  respectively.  The abortion rate, however, was  twice as high
among nonwhites, at 55.5 per 1000 women (USDC, Statistical Abstract 1988,
1987).  If the distribution of income  and education among blacks were to
resemble that of whites,  their fertility rate would be expected to match
that of whites.  The same could eventually be true of the Hispanics, but
as  newer immigrants, their  fertility rates will take longer to  decline.
Since Hispanics are growing faster than the blacks and both are growing
faster  than the whites, by  the year 2005,  the black and Hispanic
populations will be roughly equal and together will comprise over one-
fourth of  the total population.
20Households and Families
The average number of people per household was down to  2.6 by 1988
due  to  a growing number of singles and a decline in fertility.  The
average number of people per family was down to 3.2  due to  fewer children
and an increase in single parent families.  Families and households were
the  same average  size in 1900  (4.8 persons)  and still  in 1940  (3.8
persons).  Families are  those households who have members living together
that are related by blood, marriage or adoption.  Families made up 72%  of
all households  in 1987, nine percentage points fewer than in 1970  (see
Figure  3.6).
There  is  a striking decline  in the percent of married couples.  They
comprised 58%  of households and 80%  of families  in 1987,  down from  70%  of
households and 87%  of families in 1970.  The percent of all households
made up of married couples with children dropped below 28% by 1987.  One
quarter of married couple families with children had at least one
stepchild in the family.  These families, usually comprised of a
biological mother and stepfather, tended to have lower  incomes than  the
average  for married couples  (Otten, 1990).  The percent of married couple
households with no  children present remained  a steady 30%  of all
households between 1970 and 1987.
The decreased percentage of married couple households  is partly due
to  later marriages.  The median age of marriage was at a record high of
23.6 years for women in 1987,  and at a near record high of 25.9 years for
men  (USDC, P-23 NO.  150,  1987).  The percent of persons age  25-29, who had
never been married, doubled since 1970--from 19%  to  42% of men, and from
11%  to  19%  of women (Riche, 11/88).  This  lead to speculation that the
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10%  (Riche, November 1988).
Single parent families accounted for one-third of the increase  in
the number of households during the eighties.  Among Hispanics,  in 1988
19%  of families were headed by a female, compared to  11%  for non-Hispanics
(Wall Street Journal,  August  21,  1989).  Four out of five single parent
families were headed by women who had been divorced, widowed or who had
children outside of marriage.  Over the past 20 years,  two-thirds of
female headed families have had children present.  They made up about 7%
of all households  and 10%  of families.  In the first half of the 1980s,
the birthrate among unmarried women rose 12%  (mostly among whites), while
it dropped 3% among married women.  In 1986,  20%  of white infants and
74.5%  of black infants were born out of wedlock (New York Times,  January
6, 1986).  This serves  to  increase  the number of single parent households
and the number of poor, female headed households in the economy.
Male headed households  (family and nonfamily without a spouse
present) also grew rapidly in the eighties  (Waldrop, March 1989).  Male
headed families were more likely to have children present in 1987  (43%)
than in 1970  (28%),  but these families  comprised only 1% of all
households.  Two-thirds of male headed families  and 40% of female headed
families did not have children under age 18 present.  Together, they made
up  7% of all households.
Increases in male and female headed families and/or households are
attributed largely  to divorce.  Divorce  rates increased 173% between 1970
and 1980, peaking in 1981.  They leveled off, remaining at about 5 per
1000 population.  Almost half of all marriages were likely to end in
23divorce,  and about 2% of all married women divorced in any given year
(USDC, P23-No. 150,  April 1987).  Divorce  creates a larger number of
small households which has been sustained by a decline  in the rate  of
remarriage  (123 per 1000 divorced women in 1970,  compared to  82 per 1000
in 1985  [Riche,  November 1988]).  The proportion of divorced women who
ever remarry is expected to be about 70%  in the future  (Riche, November
1988).  This means that nontraditional households will continue to
increase.
Children'
There were seven million fewer children in the population in 1985
than in 1970,  the result of a large decline in the birth rate.  Figure 3.7
shows  that the proportion of households with children under age 18
declined between 1970 and 1986, and that this decline  is noticeably  large
among married couples  over age 45.  This  decline was matched, however, by
an almost equal  increase in the percent of female headed households with
children.
There are still a few large families.  In 1987,  among families with
children present, 20% had three or more children, 37%  had two children and
43% had only  one child (Crispell, January 1989).  Families with three or
more children had a lower median income, but spent a higher proportion
(20%) on food.  Accounting for 10%  of all expenditures on food, they are
important for  the continued marketing of large volume packages and basic
ingredients.  They were much more likely to report baking as a leisurely
activity than other families.  They also  accounted for 58%  of the
children living in poverty, even though 20%  of them lived  in homes with
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25annual  incomes  in excess of $50,000 per year  (Crispell, January 1989).
More than one child in five was born to an unwed mother in 1986,  and
three  in five children born that year will spend part of their childhood
in a single-parent family (Otten, 1986).  In  1980,  23%  lived with just one
parent.  Of those children who  lived with a single parent, almost two-
thirds lived with a divorced or  separated parent, compared to  60%  in 1970.
Another one-fourth lived with a parent who had never been married, a
proportion that has increased dramatically from 7% in 1970.
The average  age of preschoolers' mothers declined from  27.6  to  26
years between 1940 and 1980,  and from 31.9  to  28.7  years for fathers.  In
1980,  almost  70%  of preschoolers had been born to mothers age 20-29,
compared to  56%  in 1940;  9% were born to  teenagers in both periods  (Wall
Street Journal, July 5, 1989).  A trend for career women to have their
first child after the  age  of thirty means that these women have  fewer
total  children, leaving the majority of children with younger parents  than
ever.  Historically, 8-10%  of women age 20-40 had no children at  all, but
that was expected to  rise to  15% by 1990  (Otten, 1986).
Nonfamilv Households
During the 1980s,  households grew faster than the population (14%
verses 8.5%  [USDC, CB88-73,  May 5, 1989]).  Nonfamily households and
nonmarried families,  81%  of which were single mothers, were  the fastest
growing household types.  Nonfamily households include single person
households and those who have two  or more adults living together who are
unrelated to  each other  (see Figure 3.8).  Nonfamily households with two
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O~~~~~~cr  ~~~2were headed by men.  Among these nonfamily households with two  or more
members, one-fourth had members who were divorced, 60% had never been
married, 20%  had some children present, and their median age was 32.  This
includes nonmarried couples as  well as other adults who share a housing
unit through various rental arrangements.
The unmarried couples  in this  group made up about 4% of all couples
(married and unmarried)--a fairly stable proportion over  the  latter half
of the century.  About 20%  of the nonmarried couples were under the  age
of 25,  and over  80% were under the  age of 45  (USDC, P23,  No.  150,  1987).
Although'  cohabitation rarely lasts more than  two years  for any one couple,
one should not minimize the importance  of this  phenomenon to delay
marriage among people of all  ages  (Riche, November 1988).  Forty percent
of nonmarried households had children present, compared to 48%  of married
couples  (Otten 4/6/89;  USDC, P23-No.150, 1987).  In terms of their food
consumption patterns, nonmarried couples behave very much like married
couple households.
Nonfamily households accounted for 43%  of new households  in the
eighties.  This trend can be seen on Figure  3.9.  The  increased size of
the  top part of the bar, single person households, plus  the increase in
single parent  families, pushed down the bottom section--the portion
belonging to married couples, who accounted  for only  21%  of new households
during the  1980s.  This helps  to  illustrate  that households are becoming
smaller and more diversified in their needs  and preferences.  A market
geared to married couple families  with children, less  than one-third of
all households, will be missing a very large part of the  consumers.  More
than two out of  five households had nonmarried heads, and 53%  contained no
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29children.  The percent of households that looked like the traditional
stereotype--married couple with two or more children under age  18 and a
nonworking wife--dropped from 23%  in 1955  to  7% by 1987  (Rich, 1987).
Living Alone
A growing number of single person households is  a sign of affluence.
It  means  that individuals can afford to  establish and maintain separate
housing units.  The percent of households with one person in them
increased from 10%  in 1940 to 24%  in 1987  (USDC, Statistical Abstract,
1988,  1937).  The total number of single men and single women under age
65 who had their own households was roughly equal in 1988--6.88 million
men and 6.33 million women.  A slightly larger percent of younger single
households were male than female, but this  reversed sharply after age 54.
This  implies that no one marketing strategy is  likely to work for single
person households, since they are diversified by both age and gender.
Single women spent a larger proportion of their budgets  for food at home
and only half as much as  single men for restaurant food ($500 per year
verses  $1000)  (Stipp,  1988).  This reflects,  in part, the fact that single
women's median income was only 64%  as high as men's  in 1987.
Young single people under the age  of 34 who lived alone comprised
about  one-fourth of the single person households in 1985, compared to  13%
in 1970.  In both time periods,  one-third of single person households were
women over age  65 but the proportion comprised of elderly single men
declined from 11%  to  8%.  The median age of women living alone was  65;  it
was  only 41  for men (USDC,P-20 NO. 402,  1985).  Half of the women who
lived alone were widowed, and one-fourth were over the age of 75.  The
30number of elderly people will double  in the next 50 years,  increasing
their proportion from about 11  to 30%  of the population.  Between 30% and
38%  of the elderly are  expected to continue to live alone, with about 80%
being women.  Their  importance in the total population will increase
dramatically and swell the number of single person households  (Otten,  Wall
Street Journal, July 30,  1989).
In spite of a long term trend towards Americans  living alone,  the
inclination for young people to  do so during the eighties actually  turned
downward.  For example, among men between the  ages of 18  and 25,  54%  lived
with one  or more parents  in 1970, while 60%  did so in 1985.  Women were
less  likely to  stay at home with their parents, but their proportions  also
rose, up to 48%  in  1985  from 41%  in 1970  (Riche,  1987).  Adult children
who lived in their parents' home were more likely to  have incomes under
$10,000  (70%  of men age 22-23),  indicating that economic necessity drives
some  to this choice.  On the other end of the income scale, one-third of
men and women in their twenties who lived "at home",  lived in homes where
the family income was over $50,000 per year  (Riche, 1987).  Most likely,
they prefer to continue living in a style  to which they have become
accustomed rather than establish a household of their own at a much lower
standard of consumption.  It takes young people who have grown up
affluent longer to  find employment that will support their consumption
habits.
The slowing of a trend towards youth establishing their own
households echoes  a variety of forces, including a decline  in real
incomes, a slowing of upward mobility, an increase  in the proportion of
young people going to college,  the return of divorced children to their
31parent's home, and an increase in the median age of marriage.
Of those young adults who left  their parent's home, an increased
proportion lived alone or with friends, up  from 3% in 1960 to  almost  10%
in 1985  (Riche, 1987).  This helps to account  for the increase  in non-
family households and single person households, as  does a growing number
of middle-age, single men.  One-third of men over the  age of 18  were
unmarried (never-married, divorced or widowed) in 1987,  a 21%  increase in
seven years  (Cutler, February 1989).  The largest increase was  for those
age 22-44, half of whom were single due  to  divorce.
Single persons made up  25% of households, and those with only one or
two persons made  up over half of all households in 1990.  Young singles
are  increasingly purchasing homes;  the elderly continue to  live in their
own homes.  The  impact of smaller household size on food consumption is  to
increase the per capita expenditure, since economies of scale cannot be
realized in purchasing and preparation.  Economies of scale  in household
food consumption are  illustrated by the cost of food plans for various
size households, designed and monitored by the Unites States Department of
Agriculture.  In 1989,  a moderate cost diet plan for food eaten at home
was estimated to cost a family of four with one teenager $509.60 per
month.  The increased cost for an additional fifth or sixth person was 5%
less than the cost of adding the fourth person.  Increased food costs for
the seventh or more persons was 10%  less for each additional person
(USDA, Family Economics Review, 1989,  p. 26).  The Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CES) data from 1985  shows that actual food expenditures increase
by 66%  between one  and two person households, by 27%  for the third person,
by 14%  for the  fourth person and by 7.5%  for the  fifth person.  Households
32with six persons or more actually spent 2% less for  food than those with
five  (USDL,  BLS,  1987).  Smaller sized households spend more per capita on
food.  In the  CES data referred to  above, the annual per capita
expenditures for household units of various sizes was  $1,935  for one
person, $1,603 for two,  $1,355  for three, $1,160  for four, $999  for five
and $816  for 6 persons  or more.  An earlier study by West and Price  (1976)
found that  the per capita value of food consumed fell by $2.54 per month
for each extra person in a household.  That would be about $7.40 in  1990
dollars.
Price  (1988)  found that the greatest economies of household size
existed in the consumption of fruits  and vegetables with  lesser economies
in bakery products, cheese,  soups and sauces.  Overall, he  found that a
family of four spent 6% less  for food and used 22%  less food per adult
equivalent person than an one person household.
Small households increase the demand for  food away from home,  take
out food, conveniently prepared food and food that can be purchased in
small portions.  Single persons spend up  to 50%  of their  food budget on
food away from home  (Lubin,  1986).  Rising income among single men was
found to increase  their food expenditures more than for women.  For
example,  Sexauer and Mann (1979) found that the differences in food
expenditures between upper- and lower-income, single males was $11.00 per
week (1.7% higher),  whereas it was only $4.00 per week  (1.3% higher) for
single females.  However, upper-income, single females  spent an average
of $8.26,  or  30%  less,  on all food per week than upper-income males.
Singles were found to  consume relatively large amounts of poultry, fruit
and vegetables  (not potatoes) and dairy products.  They consumed less
33pork, beef, eggs, processed vegetables, sugar and sweets than those  in
larger households  (Sexauer and Mann, 1979;  Smallwood and Blaylock, 1981).
The overall  impact of a larger number of small households  increased
aggregate expenditures on food away from home, dairy products, poultry,
processed and fresh fruits.  It  decreased total expenditures on beef,
milk, and processed vegetables between 1972  and 1981  (Kinsey, 1986).  As
household size has continued to  decline, food expenditures can be expected
to  continue  in the direction indicated.
The  signals for food markets  are somewhat mixed.  Smaller households
spend more per capita on food, but  they tend to have lower incomes.  About
one  third of single person households are women over age 65 whose  total
food expenditure  is  relatively low.  Single women's  income  is  typically
low.  Therefore,  they spend a higher proportion of their  income on food.
As household size  continues to decline, per capita food expenditures can
be expected to  increase, and more so,  if the  income  of smaller households
also increases.
A growing number of male headed households  is a phenomenon that  is
largely unexplored in terms of food marketing.  Most of these men shopped
and cooked for themselves.  They were less  likely than women to use
shopping lists or coupons  (Wall Street Journal, November 27,  1989).  They
tended to be conservative about  trying new products and their cooking
skills were often minimal  (Cutler, Febuary 1989).  They ate away from home
more often than other people.  They have higher incomes than female
household heads,  and can afford to purchase high quality food with several
built  in services.
Figure  3.10 summarizes the proportion of households comprised of
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7L~~~~~~~~3various combinations of men, women and children in 1987,  and how fast
each type of household grew between 1970 and 1987.  It  is  easy to  see  that
male headed households grew faster than others, and that married couples
with children declined.  The  relative median income  also shows that male
household heads have higher incomes.
Group Quarters
Not counted among the households on Figures  3.6  through 3.10 are
persons who live in group quarters.  About 2.5%  of  the population, or 5.7
million persons, lived in group quarters  in 1980--quarters  such as
college dormitories  (1.1%)  or  institutions  (0.9%),  including homes for the
aged, mentally ill and prisons.  Those places  that had more than 40
persons per 1000 living in group quarters were Hawaii  (largely military),
Washington D.C.,  North Dakota and Vermont  (mostly students).  The average
United States group quarter population was  25 per 1000 population  (Paris,
1985).  The type of group quarter  can make a difference  for food
marketing.  With a large number of students  in college dormitories with
dining halls and no cooking  facilities,  inexpensive restaurants  and take
out food may be  in high demand.  If large numbers are confined to
institutions, a wholesale food business will be more profitable.  Local
market niches can be determined to a large extent by the type of group
quarters present.  The trend is towards fewer institutional homes  for  the
elderly and the  ill, and more for college students and prisoners.
36AGE
During the baby boom (1946 to 1964),  the birth rate peaked in 1957  at
25.3 births per 1000 population (USDC, Statistical Abstract-1988,  1987).
Those babies were age  26  to 43 by 1990, and will swell  the ranks of older
middle age households  (ages 46  to  63)  until 2010, when they will begin to
swell the ranks of the retired population.  The nation's median age was  30
in 1980, 32  in 1990, and will be over 40 by 2030  (USDC, P-25 No.952,
1984).
Changes  in the relative number of older people in the population is
often illustrated by bar graphs like Figure  3.11.  They show that, for all
races  in the United States,  the percent of elderly verses young will
increase dramatically by 2030, when the baby boomers will be age  66-84.
Unless  there is  a dramatic  change in  fertility, the percent of young
people will decrease and the distribution of ages will look much more like
the shaded column than a pyramid.  There will be about the  same percent of
the population in each age group.  The absolute number and the percentage
of whites age  5-24 declined in the five years prior to 1985  (USDC, CB86-
76,  1986).  The  total number of children under age  five is  expected to
decline from  18 million in 1988  to 16.9 million by 2000.  The nonwhite
population is younger than whites, largely due  to differential fertility
rates.  This  can also be seen on Figure  3.11 by looking at the shape of
the nonwhite age distributions, which remains more like a pyramid even by
2030.
The relative size of each age group in 1986,  and the projected change
by the end of  the century, reveals the relentless movement of the baby
boom population bulge as  it  ages.  Age 0-17 comprised 30%  of the
37Figure  3.11 Age Distribution in the United States by Gender and Race:
Percent of Men and Women in Each Age Group
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38population in 1986,  and is  expected to  increase 3.2% by year  2000.  For
subsequent ages,  the statistics follow:  Age 18-24, 9% with a 3.5%
decrease;  Age 24-34, 18% with a  15%  decrease;  Age 35-44, 14%  with a 15%
increase;  Age 45-55,  9.5%  with a 46%  increase;  Age 55-64, 9% with a 13%
increase;  Age 65-74, 7% with  less  than 1% increase, and those age  74 and
older,  5% with a 26%  increase  (Crudele, 1989;  USDC, Statistical Abstract,
1988,  1987).
By far the most common household type in every age  group  (except
those over age 75)  is  a married couple household.  Figure  3.12 shows the
percent of households  in each age group that was a married couple, a
married couple with children, female and male headed families with
children in 1988.  Figure 3.13  shows the percent of households in each age
group that was a single male or female.  One can readily see that  the
married couple bar is  the tallest  in each age group  except for those over
age 75,  where  female single person households dominate.  Over half of
single female households were over age 65  (6.55 million),  and over half of
them were over age 75.  Only 22%  of single male households were over  age
65.  The largest  group of married couples with children were between the
ages of 25  and 44.  Children all but disappear from those households over
age 64.  In the future,  there should be more married couple households
among those over age  64 as  the life expectancy of men increases.
Households whose head was  age 15  to  24 in 1987 made up  6% of all
households, while those age  25  to 34 made up 23%.  The number of people  in
these age  groups will decline by the end of the century.  Households whose
head was age 35-44 made up 21%  of households, those age 45-54, 15%.  By
the year 2000, people in these age groups will increase dramatically.
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41~~~~~~~~~~~~cThose households age 55-64 made up  14% of households, and those age  65-74,
13%.  Their numbers will also  increase by 2000, but more dramatically by
2010.  Those households whose head is  over age 75  made up only 9% of
households but will grow 26% by 2000 and more thereafter (Waldrop,
3/1989).
Mortality has declined dramatically for the elderly, with life
expectancies  increasing one and one-half times over  the twentieth century.
For example,  in 1900 white males life expectancy was 48.23 years at birth;
it was 72 years in 1986.  White women's  life expectancy went from 51  to  79
years  ine  that time  (USSDHHS, October 1988,  p. 13).  The greatest increases
over the  century, however, has been in the doubling of life expectancies
of nonwhites to age  67.2  for males and age 75  for females  in 1986.  Figure
3.14 illustrates how increased life expectancies over the century will
sustain a growing population of elderly people.  For example, less than
12%  survived to  age 80  in 1900, while 50%  are expected to do  so by 2000.
Age affects food consumption because caloric and nutritional needs
change  as people age,  and because tastes  and choices change with income
and experience.  Children consume more milk products, eggs,  soups,  snack
foods,  sugar based beverages and desserts, but fewer fruits, vegetables,
table spreads  and meat than older people  (Cronin et.al.,  1982).  With
fewer children in the population, the demand for these types of foods
should adjust accordingly.  On a per capita basis, the baby boomers who
are age  35-44  in 1990  spent about  2.5%  less on food than the average
consumer  (Kiplinger, 1990).  Food expenditures were up for this age groups
only because  there are so  many of them.  As  they move into the elderly
group they will affect food demand by the elderly after 2010.  Food needs
42Figure  3.14 Life Expectancy in the United States  Over the  Twentieth
Century.
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43for the elderly, single person household are different than the food needs
and preferences of younger singles who eat more, eat out more often and
are more inclined to  follow food fads.  Households headed by persons age
55-64  spent about 10%  more on food than the average household, while those
over age  65  spent about 12%  less.  On a per capita basis though, elderly
households under age 75  spend 14% more, mostly due  to the small household
size which requires  larger food outlays per person  (Lazer and Shaw, 1987).
The ageing of the population is  considered one of the most  important
trends  in the  socioeconomic environment in the United States.  Some argue
that it 'is the single most important story on the demographic scene
(Batson, 1987).  It  is one  that can be identified with considerable
certainty and it  foretells changes in preferences and food demand.  Thus,
a special chapter on the elderly  is  included in the book where more
details  about their characteristics  and likely preferences.
EDUCATION
The major trends  in education are  increasing numbers  of high school
and college educated people over  the age of  25,  along with a disparity in
educational achievement between whites and nonwhites.  Overall,  completion
of at least four year of high school  increased from 24%  of the population
in 1940 to  76%  in 1986.  Among whites and Asians, the percent was about
77%;  among blacks,  51%,  and among Hispanics,  44%.  One-fifth of adults
had completed college  in 1988,  compared to 5% in 1940.  The  rate for
whites was 21%,  compared to  33%  for Asians,  11%  for blacks and 10%  for
Hispanics.  Twenty-three percent of men and 17%  of women had college
degrees, but among younger people age 25-29,  differences narrowed to  23%
44for men and 21%  for women  (Minneapolis Star and Tribune, December 2,
1987;  USDC, CB88-151,  1988;  CB88-142,  1988;  CB87-188, 1987;  CB88-59,
1988).
Among teenagers age  16-17  in 1980, the highest levels of school
enrollment were among the Japanese and Chinese  (96%),  the  lowest was among
the Hispanics  (80%),  with 89%  for whites.  Among the 20-24 year olds,  the
Chinese Americans had the highest proportion of people enrolled in school
(60%);  whites had 24%, blacks had 21%,  and Hispanics had 18%  (Batson,
December 7, 1987).  Education is known to be highly correlated with
income, 'o it  should be no  surprise that Asians have a higher median
income than other ethnic  groups, including whites.  The  increase  in  the
number and percent of people with high school and higher education
foretells higher  incomes  for a larger proportion of the population.  It
also helps to  explain the disparity in income between the uneducated and
others.  Table 3.1  shows the direct relationship between education and
earnings  in 1984.  The proportion that were college graduates  at that time
was  15.5%.  By 1986,  that percent had already increased to 19.5  (USDC,
Statistical Abstract, 1988,  1987).
As  greater numbers of people receive more education, the ranks of the
educated labor  force and higher income earners grow.  Their increased
supply tends  to put downward pressure on incomes of the educated and helps
to  explain part of the trend towards slower  income growth, more  "middle-
class"  unemployment, and less  upward mobility for the younger generation
in the past decade.  Those without at least a high school education are
even more vulnerable  to unemployment, as greater numbers of well educated
45TABLE  3.1  INCOME AND EDUCATION
(ALL  U.S. PERSONS OVER AGE 18,  1984)
Persons by Education  Monthly Income  Percent
Mean  of Persons
All Persons  $1,155  100.0
Doctorate  3,265  0.5
Professional  3,871  1.0
Master's  2,288  3.4
Bachelor's  1,841  10.6
Associate  1,346  3.6
Vocational  1,219  1.8
Some College, no  degree  1,169  17.8
High School Graduate only  1,045  35.5
Not High School Graduate  693  26.0
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, What's it
Worth. Current Population Reports,  Series P-70, No.11, September, 1987,
p. 7-8.
46people take jobs  for which they may be over trained.
As  a group, black men have been dropping out of the educational
process.  Their enrollment in college dropped from 34%  in 1976  to  26%  in
1985  (USDC,CB88-151, 1988).  The absolute number of black males enrolled
in college declined from a high of 878,000  in 1984  to 861,000 in 1986
(USDC, Statistical Abstract, 1988,  1987).  Black males with a college
education represented only 3% of the whole population in 1984, and fewer
have pursued that level of education since.
The disparity in education and continued immigration means  that food
vendors  will  face a persistent group of poor consumers.  They will be
mostly nonwhite households or single mothers and, at the extreme,  the
homeless.  These consumers are very sensitive to price and will be
purchasing lower cost food and fewer services.  The regions of the country
where education levels were the lowest in 1985 were the  South (69%  high
school  graduates and 18%  college graduates) and non-metropolitan areas  in
general  (69% with high school diplomas).  The West, where 80% were high
school  graduates and 24%  college graduates, and metropolitan areas, where
78%  were high school  graduates, will be areas with higher average  incomes
and a demand for  food that meets upscale tastes--more convenience, more
variety and more food prepared away from home  (USDC, CB87-188, Dec. 2,
1987).
College graduates were 67%  more likely to report dieting to  loose
weight (Shlosberg, 1987).  They will be a large part of the market for
low calorie  foods.  Those with more education tend to be more
adventuresome in their  food selections and will adopt new food varieties
more quickly.  They eat out more often.  Education has been found to be
47the most  important determinant of knowledge about nutrition  (Birdsall,
1972;  Hinton, 1963;  Hertzler, 1976;  Hunt, 1976).  Educated people are also
better  informed about food safety issues  and will demand higher quality
food and food service.  Price will be less of a decision factor  for them
than food quality and diet compatibility.
INCOME TRENDS
There  is  a popular perception that average household incomes in the
United States  are declining and that the rich are getting richer and the
poor are'getting poorer;  that the  large middle class, mass market is
diminishing, and that an underclass of permanently unemployable persons
has developed.  Considerable evidence supports this  perception.
Aggregate  income  statistics such as per capita personal disposal
income, median family income  and individual wage earnings reveal much the
same picture--rising  incomes until about 1973,  and stagnation thereafter.
This  reversal in income growth has been called "...the  major economic
story of the postwar period"  (Levy,  1987).
U.S. per capita disposable income  (PDI) was $15,481  in 1987.  It
slowed less  in recent years than median family income because it is
calculated by dividing total income from all sources evenly across  all
persons.  In recent years,  PDI increased in spite of low productivity
because there have been more workers  (earners) and fewer children
(nonearners) over which to  divide total income  (Litan et al.,  1988/89).
As  long as  the economy grows,  that is,  gross national product grows  faster
than inflation, PDI  tends  to  increase.  Figure 3.15  shows the  trend in
real PDI  (in  1982 dollars).  One can clearly see that its growth slows
48Figure  3.15
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49 49during periods of recession, represented by the  shaded areas.  Although
widely used as a measure of economic well being, like most aggregate
measures, PDI hides as  much as  it reveals.  To  learn about the spending
power of households and their relative well being, one has to  look at how
income  is  distributed across households with different characteristics.
Changes in real median family incomes increased steadily in the post-
World War II period, doubling between 1947 and 1973.  By 1975,  this  income
had fallen by $1,700  in real  terms, more than recovered by 1979,  only to
fall  again between 1980 and 1982.  By  1984,  it was  $46  less  than it was  in
1975.  By 1986,  it  stood at only $1,596 more than in 1970, with most of
those gains coming after  1984.  Figure 3.16  illustrates  the  trends  in
median income  for all  families and for whites and blacks.  (The trend for
Hispanics was  similar to that of blacks, only the level was about $2,000
higher.)  It  is  easy to  see that increases began to  level out  in the early
1970s.  Real median income  for unrelated individuals  rose less  rapidly
over  the long run, but continued to  rise while family incomes  fell  (Levy,
1987).
Real median income does not account for the status of households or
families relative to  the poverty level.  A Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) study (1988) adjusted family  incomes by dividing pretax cash  income
by the appropriate poverty level  for the family structure  to  derive
"adjusted family income".  Plotting adjusted family income  (median income
as  a percent of  the poverty level) since  1970 reveals that non-elderly,
childless families had incomes over 4 times as great as single mothers,
whose adjusted family incomes have stayed around the poverty level since
1970  (Figure 3.17).  Indexing adjusted family incomes  so  that 1970 equaled
50Figure  3.16
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51Figure  3.17
Trends in Median Adjusted Family Income by Family Type, 1970-1986
Trends in Median Adjusted Family Income, by Family Type,
1970-1986
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52100,  and plotting income trends for various family types,  shows that
incomes  of the elderly increased the most, and those of  single mothers
fell.  Figure 3.18 shows  that by 1986,  cash incomes rose  to  163%  of  the
poverty threshold for  the elderly, while they fell  to  82%  for single
mothers.  The relative well being of families clearly depends on the
family structure and age.
Income Distribution
The equality of income distribution across families  is measured by
plotting'  the percent of aggregate family income belonging to each
cumulative decile  (10%  increments)  of the population of families.  This
produces what  is  called a Lorenze curve.  The size of the area between the
Lorenze  curve and the  "line of equality" provides a measure of how equally
income is  distributed.  Two times the  size of that area is  called the
"Gini Coefficient".  The closer together the  two  lines,  the smaller  the
Gini  Coefficient, and the more equally distributed is  income.  Figure 3.19
shows the Lorenze Curve for the United States distribution of family money
income  (from all  sources)  in the mid-1980s.  It shows, for instance,  that
the lowest  20%  of the families received about  5% of all family income.  If
income were evenly distributed, the lowest and highest 20%  of families
would each receive  20%  of aggregate  income,  the Lorenze  Curve would lie on
top of the straight line of equality, and the Gini Coefficient would be
zero.
The Gini Coefficient has changed very little, though  it fell slightly
between 1947  and 1969,  and then rose  again.  This  illustrates, in a modest
way, how incomes tend to become more evenly distributed when general
53Figure  3.18
Trends  in Median Adjusted Family Income, Relative  to 1970 Median Adjusted
Family Income, Selected Family Types, 1970-1986.
Trends in Median Adjusted Family Income, Relative to 1970
Median Adjusted Family Income, Selected Family Types,
1970-1986
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55incomes  are rising.  As  the  total size of the pie  increases,  the  size  of
everybody's piece  increases, and redistribution from rich to  poor is
accomplished with little pain.  As growth in the  total pie decreases,
redistribution is more difficult and incomes  tend to become less evenly
distributed.  Table 3.2  shows that the poorest 20%  of  families received
5.6%  of all family income in 1969,  a year in which the richest  20%
received the least, 40.6%.  Income distribution was almost the  same in
1984 as  it was  in 1947, except the richest 5% had less of the income,  and
those in the fourth quintile had slightly more.  By 1987,  the richest 5%
controlled 16.9%  of aggregate  income  (Pennar, 1989).  The Gini
Coefficient was  .385 in 1984, up  slightly from  .376 in 1947,  and up  from
.349  in 1969.  This demonstrates  that family incomes  are becoming
somewhatless equally distributed.
The  last column on Table  3.2  shows  that the Gini  Coefficient for
unrelated individuals  is consistently larger than for families, but has
been falling;  incomes here are becoming more evenly distributed.  This can
be  attributed largely to  rising incomes of women relative  to men through
increased employment and rising social security payments.  The  level of
income for unrelated individuals  in each quintile  is significantly lower
than for families, a fact that is  seen on the bottom two  lines of Table
3.2.  Most persons and families in the first quintile have  incomes below
their poverty threshold.
Using money  income to measure consumer well being and income
distribution, though common, has  its  faults.  It includes government
transfer payments  in cash, but not in kind.  Those who receive  food
stamps, health care or housing, tax breaks or production subsidies have
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57consumption power above that of their cash income.  Those with large
families have less spending power per head for any given level of cash
income.  Money income does not account for accumulated wealth which, if
added to money income, produces even larger Gini  Coefficients.  For
example,  in 1984 the  top  20% of households by money income standards held
75%  of the assets owned by households;  the  top 2% held 26%  of the  assets
(Levy,  1987).
Table 3.3  summarizes the  distribution of income among households of
various types  in 1987.  In spite of many changes in the relative size of
age groups and their relative  incomes,  it  shows  that middle-age households
(age 35-54) still had the highest median incomes,  the greatest percent
who made over $50,000 per year and the smallest percent who made under
$10,000 per year.  The  income profile for those under age  24 and over age
64  looks very similar.  The big difference is  in their ownership of
assets.  American households had a median net worth of $44,000  in 1986,
and an average of $145,000  (Avery and Kennickell, 1989).  Median net worth
rises steadily until age  65, when it  is  drawn down slightly.  The elderly,
a growing segment of  the population, own a large proportion of our
collective net worth.  While only  12%  of households under the  age of 35
had a net worth over $50,000, 56%  of households over age  65 had a net
worth of  $50,000 or more.  Over half of the median net worth of the
elderly was  in interest bearing accounts, the median value of which was
$31,399  in 1987  (USDC, Statistical Abstract-1989,  1988).
The distribution of earnings as  opposed to  income has been much less
evenly distributed historically and growing more so.  The Gini Coefficient
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591987).  This  increase is  attributed largely to  a growth in the number of
families that had no earners at all, up  from 5.4%  in 1949  to  15.1%  in
1984.  The number of "no earner"  families increases as  retirement age
decreases  and more families of all ages are headed by women.  Since the
income distribution of all families remained fairly steady (Table 3.2),
unearned income  (government transfers,  pensions,  interest and dividends)
had to have replaced earnings as  a source of spending power for many
American households.  In fact, the proportion of total personal income
from wages and salaries fell from 66%  to  59%  between 1970 and 1986, while
transfer payments rose from 10%  to 15%,  and interest and dividends  rose
from  11%  to  16%  (Council of Economic Advisors, 1987, p. 272-273).
On balance, aggregate income  figures do not reveal many dramatic
changes regarding income distribution.  They even seem to defy common
observations and attitudes about the demise of the middle class.  However,
shifts in income and earnings among different household types--ages,
size,  gender and ethnic groups--lends credence  to popular perceptions.
For example,  Table 3.4 shows  that the proportion of households in the
second and third quintiles that were elderly increased considerably
between 1949  and 1984, while their representation among the poor declined.
Husband-wife families age 35-64 grew as  a proportion of the upper two
quintiles at the expense of younger families.  Families headed by females
under age  64  (about half of such households) made up over twice  the
proportion of poor families in 1984 as they did in 1949.  Related to  these
movements among household types,  is  labor force participation.  Notice
that in the lowest quintile,  the percent of families with no earners was
44%  in 1984.  No earner  families more than doubled since 1949  in all
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unprecedented numbers.
Is  the Middle Class Declining?
A picture of  offsetting income  trends  is beginning to  develop.  A
series of bar graphs  from Levy  (1988) confirms  the popular observation
that more people and families are entering the  low and high income
brackets.  Figure 3.20 shows  that the proportion of employed individuals,
men and women, who earned less  than $20,000 and over $50,000,  increased
between i973  and 1986.  The percent who earned middle incomes  declined.
The percent of families with incomes between $10,000 and $50,000 declined,
while the percent of female headed households under age 64  increased in
all income groups under $60,000.  Interpretation of the changes  in family
income distribution illustrated here are  two fold.  One  is  the optimistic
view.  Since a smaller proportion of households have middle level
incomes,  and the percent with $20,000  or less was a constant 31%, more
families  are moving up into higher income brackets,  leaving fewer  in the
middle income ranges.
The pessimistic view is  that the spending power of middle level
incomes has declined relative  to  the period before 1973.  It is  true that
the rate of increase in real  income  for people in the middle rose very
slowly compared to their expectations.  They were not able  to increase
their consumption as  rapidly since 1973  as their parents and mentors did
before them.  Young people and those with low and middle incomes must
spend a larger portion of their income  on necessities like food, shelter
and energy.  During the  1970s,  the price of necessities rose 15%  faster
62Figure  3.20
Distribution of Earnings by  Individual Men and Women and  the Distribution
of  Income by Families,  1973,  1986.
Earnings Distribution of Hen and Women, 1973,  1986.
Men  and women, aged 25-55, who worked more  than one  'tour  a year
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63than the overall consumer price index, resulting in a greater decline in
real  incomes among the middle income and poorer households  (Browning,
1981).  Adjustments in their spending patterns  show that they had to
increase expenditures for necessities by about $1000 per year  (in 1984
dollars) between 1973 and 1981.  Consumer expenditures  that decreased in
order to accommodate these necessities were  for furniture, clothes,
personal care and charitable contributions.  A large number of young
households buoyed the restaurant business and gave  the impression that
money for food away from home was plentiful, but average household
expenditures on food away from home went up only $47  per year  (in constant
1984 dollars) between 1973 and 1981  (Levy & Michel, 1986).
Besides a fall  in real  income growth,  the demise  of several middle
income  (blue-collar and agriculture) jobs, the  type held by many males
with little education, led to thousands of displaced workers whose family
incomes declined as a result.  The  types of jobs  that increased were  lower
paying service jobs--largely filled by women, immigrants  and young baby
boomers--and white collar jobs that required education or  training that
middle age, middle income, blue collar workers did not have.  Of the 14
million new jobs  created between 1973  and 1980,  one in five paid less  than
$7,400 per year in 1986  dollars.  Of the 12 million jobs created since
1980, two in five paid only slightly more than the poverty rate  for a 2
person household under age 65  in 1986  ($7,372).  One-third of the net new
year-around, full-time jobs created since 1978 paid a wage below the
poverty level of $11,203  for a family of four  (Bluestone and Harrison,
1987).  Apparently, being employed is no guarantee that one can live above
the poverty threshold.
64Although the share of new year-around, full-time jobs that paid high
wages rose  from 3.6  to  9.2% between 1973 and 1978, and has remained that
high, there has recently been a rash of displaced white collar workers
from middle management positions.  This  is  expected to increase  in the
1990s as American companies pare down their costs to become competitive in
world markets.  In 1986,  there were over 5.1 million displaced workers;
half came from manufacturing industries who closed their plants.  Lay offs
in the wholesale-retail  trades  and financial services  (mostly white collar
jobs)  accounted for another 27%  of the displaced workers, only two-
thirds  of whom were reemployed.  The latter group may find it  easier to
relocate or  retrain, but the opportunities at  the  top are shrinking
relative  to the supply of qualified labor.  Fifteen percent of displaced
workers dropped out of the labor market altogether  (USDC, Statistical
Abstract-1988, 1987).  The despair felt by this segment of the population
and the fear  it instills in all workers, comes as much from a decline in
opportunity for advancement as from a decline in relative income.  The
change in income growth relative to  expectation is  dramatically
illustrated in Figure 3.21, which shows the average gain in men's income
between the ages  of 40 and 50 in roughly the past three decades.  Income
growth over a lifetime has slowed considerably for men.
The composition of families with the lowest 20%  of income has also
changed dramatically.  This has widespread implications for government
policy, national productivity and consumer demand of all sorts.  The
percent of families with incomes below $20,000, comprised of female heads,
increased from 23  to  31% between 1973 and 1986  (Levy,  1988).  The result
is  that over one-third of all the nation's children live  in homes where
65Figure 3.21
Average Income Gain for Men Passing form Age 40  to Age  50  in the United
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66income  is under $20,000.  Twenty-one percent of children also live  in
families with incomes over $50,000.  Levy (1988) argues  that the popular
picture of a declining middle class  is not especially applicable for all
families taken together, but it  is  appropriate for families with children.
If one juxtaposes  this  information against the fertility rates of families
with different income and education levels, and thinks about the
development of human capital,  there seems little choice but for high
income households to finance the health and education of children  (and
parents)  in low income households, whether this be through government tax
dollars or private contributions.  Public food programs to ensure adequate
nutrition will continue to be as  important as ever.
The separate distribution of earnings of men and women, as
illustrated on Figure  3.22,  also reinforces the impression that, at least
for men, middle level  incomes are  declining.  The  top half shows  that the
percent of men earning under $20,000 and over $50,000 increased between
1973 and 1986.  The bottom half shows  that the percent of women earning
low incomes declined, but over two-thirds of  them had incomes under
$20,000 in both time periods.  The relative change in women's and men's
earnings  and wages reflects  major changes  in the  labor force, and
facilitates major changes  in family structure, and in how family members
make purchase decisions.  Sociologists and psychologists  say that it
changes  the power balance  in household decisions.  It also changes  the
relative value of members'  time and how it  is  allocated to household and
other tasks.
Wives entering the labor force did not, however, decrease the
equality of family incomes very much,  if at all.  Wives increased their
67Figure 3.22
Distribution of Earnings by  Prime-age men and Prime-age women who worked at
least one hour a year.  1973, 1986.
Earnings Distribution  of  Prime-Age Men.  1973,  1986.
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68labor force participation in all income  quintiles, and the earnings  of
wives whose husbands had low incomes  (less than $15,000) raised family
incomes relatively more than the earnings of wives whose husbands earned
more.  For families where the husband earned less than $15,000,  the wife's
average earnings  (whether she worked or not) was 40%  of her husbands
income, while the average wife's earnings was only 15%  of her husband's  if
he earned over $35,000 per year in 1984  (Levy,  1987).  In 1987, wives who
worked full-time, all year still earned only 57%  as  much as  their husbands
on average  (CB89-118, 1989).  In 1983,  one-fifth of working wives earned
more than their husbands.  Of those who did, 51% had no children under age
18,  24% had four  or more years  of college, and 31% had executive or
professional jobs.  Seventy-two percent worked full-time, year-around,
compared to 43% of all  employed wives  (CB86-71, 1986).
Dual earner households at all levels of income have improved their
spending power relative to  single earner families.  For example,  the real
median family income in 1969 (in 1985 dollars)  for married couples where
the wife was employed was $25,062;  $20,051  where she was not.  By 1987,
that  income increased 58%  to  $39,516  (constant 1985 dollars)  if she was
employed, and by 47%  to $29,393  if she was not.  Between 1981 and 1987,
wives' earnings  grew 23%,  compared to  12%  for husbands'.  The proportion
of wives working full time increased from 44 to  50%.  By 1987,  the annual
incomes of families with two full time working spouses was  $49,030,
compared to $31,010 where only the husband worked (USDC, CB89-118,  1989;
USDC, Statistical Abstract-1989, 1988).
Table 3.5 compares  the number of men and women workers, and their
incomes by age and education in 1986, and changes since 1973.  Since this
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70includes all men and women who worked at all in those years, the ratio of
women's to men's earnings, even for young people with 4 years of college,
was only  .65.  For college educated women and men who worked year around,
full-time,  the ratio was  .73.  This table does not include people with
more  than four years of education, so highly paid professional jobs are
not represented.  With those caveats, one can still see that  the
percentage change in wages, earnings  and hours are all negative  for all
men except the youngest men with four years  of college.  The changes are
all positive for women.
Increasing working hours  is  the surest way  to  increase annual
earnings.  Notice that for women age 35-44 with four years of college, a
23%  increase  in hours worked, resulted in a 38%  increase  in annual
earnings and a 12%  increase  in wages.  Men in that age and education group
decreased annual hours by 4% and lost 11%  in annual earnings and 7% in
wages.
As a larger and larger proportion of the labor force  is  comprised of
women, average wages and earnings will grow more slowly.  When most
employable women have entered the labor force and, ultimately, work full-
time, the chance for families to  increase their real  future incomes by
increasing total hours of labor will slow.  Therefore, future growth in
family incomes will depend more on the growth in productivity and wages
than on the ability of individuals to pool incomes.  Increased education
and training for higher paying jobs will be the only way "up" for
individuals and families in the future.  A report titled "The Forgotten
Half",  issued in 1988 by the W. T. Grant Foundation, concluded that
"during his or her lifetime, a college graduate  can expect to earn double
71the money of a high school graduate and more than triple that of a high
school drop-out"  (Berg, 1989).
Income by Region
How income  is distributed by region affects markets  for food and
other goods.  The South has typically had the  lowest incomes.  In 1987,
its median household income was still  the lowest  ($23,719).  The highest
median household income was  in the West  ($27,914), but  the percent of
total aggregate personal  income attributed to  each region was highest in
the South  (30.9) and lowest  in the West  (21.5)  (USDC, Statistical
Abstract-1989,  1988).  Former large  income disparities between regions
have largely disappeared.  The larger disparities are now between rural
and urban areas  and between cities and suburbs.  Nonfarm family incomes
were 19%  greater than farm family incomes  in 1987, but that gap was even
greater  in 1970 at 50%.  The  size of the  gap between city and suburban
family incomes was 11%  in favor of those in the suburbs in 1959,  growing
to  24% by 1983.  This was mainly due to different types of family
structures.  One quarter  of central city families were headed by women,
whose incomes were relatively low.  To what extent gentrification of the
central  cities will decrease  the urban-suburban gap is not known, but  the
implications for  food marketing are  fairly clear.  Lower cost food and
fewer services will be in demand where incomes are  relatively low,
particularly in rural areas and central cities.  The market niches  for
high variety, high quality, and high service will be in the suburbs and in
pockets  of cities recaptured by well paid households.
The primary effects of  income on food consumption and the role  it
72plays in estimating the demand for various types of food are discussed in
detail in the chapter on food economics.  However, in an affluent society,
the effects of rising incomes on food consumption patterns is  intimately
tied to the effect of labor force participation on the value of time.
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
"A very significant portion - perhaps  the overwhelming
majority - of all waking hours of all mankind
throughout all of history have been associated with
getting enough food.  All individuals of a group
shared this need, and  ....the strategy for getting
enough food  ... affected every other aspect of the
group's culture"  (Gibson, 1981).
Compared to  the quest for adequate  food described above, Americans
treat food acquisition rather casually.  But, perhaps, we have changed
less than we think.  Americans purchase virtually all of their food,
requiring money which they obtain through employment.  Maintaining the
spending power of the household so that food consumption can continue to
be treated as a matter of fact, rather than a matter of quest, has
required more intensive labor force participation by household members and
increased investment in food and agricultural technology.  It has changed
our culture and the way we approach daily life.
The greatest changes in labor force over the past two decades have
been an increase in the number and percent of married women and mothers
working outside  the home, and a decrease  in the percent of working men.
Also, there has been a decrease  in the proportion of households  that have
only one worker in the labor  force, along side an increase  in the percent
of households that have two or more full time workers or no workers  at
all  (Table 3.4).
73Future changes  in the labor force will center around a decreasing
percent of white male workers.  In 1947,  two-thirds  of the labor force was
comprised of white males  (Levy,  1987).  Figure  3.23 shows that in 1985,
47% of the labor force was white males, and  36%  was white females.  Future
growth in the labor force will come primarily from an increasing number of
females  and immigrants.  Between now and 2000, three-fifths of the new
entrants  into  the labor force will be nonwhite, half of them Hispanic
(Riche, February 1988).
Between 1940 and 1986,  the percent of women in the labor force
doubled---from 27.4 to 55.4%.  For men, the percentages went from 79%  to
76%.  The percent of married women in the labor force increased over 3
times, while the percent of single, widowed or divorced women increased by
a factor of 1.4  (USDC, Statistical Abstract-1988,  1987).  Tables  3.6 and
3.7 illustrate men's and women's  labor force participation by age and
marital status since 1960.  There was a steady drop in the percent of
married men in the labor force in all age groups.  The  drop was  small for
those ages 20-44, but after age 45,  there was a noticeable decline,
especially among married men.
For married women the story was reversed.  There was a steady climb
in the percent of women in the  labor force except for singles over age 44,
and widowed/divorced women over age 65  (Table 3.7).  The latter may be
partially explained by rising incomes among the elderly through indexed
social security payments, pensions and other financial investments,  that
allow older people to  retire earlier.
The  labor force participation rates of men and women are converging.
Those of single men and women are very close at all ages below 65.  Almost
74Figure  3.23
The Workplace Diversifies
Who  made  up the  U.S.  labor force  . . And who will account for its
in  198M...  growth  through the year 2000'
(In percent)  (In percent)
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7570%  of married women in prime childbearing years  (age 20-44) are  in the
labor force  (USDC, Statistical Abstract-1988,  1987).
In spite  of their maternal roles,  over half of mothers with children
under age  6, and over  70%  of those with children between the ages of  6 and
17 were in the  labor force in 1987.  The  development of this phenomenon is
illustrated in Table 3.8.  Those with children under age 6 increased their
labor force participation over  5 fold since  1950.  Half of the married
mothers with an infant return to work within the first year after birth.
Over  62%  of those with a five year old are in the labor  force  (USDC,
Statistical Abstract-1988, 1987).
It  is difficult to sort out the full-time,  full-year employees  from
the full-time, part-year employees.  The  Census Bureau defines full-time
workers as those who work 34  or more hours a week for at least one week a
year.  Part-time workers are  those who work less than 34 hours per week.
Being in the labor force  full time does not necessarily imply that one
works all year.  Only part of the picture on the extent of  labor force
participation can be obtained by looking at the data of full and part-time
workers.  Over  the last decade, the percent of all full-time workers who
were female  increased from 35%  to  39%, with a concomitant decrease  in the
percent of males who worked full time.  Three-fourths of women who work,
work full time  (USDC, Statistical Abstract-1988,  1987).  In 1985,  mothers
most likely to work full time were those who were divorced  (63%),  followed
by married mothers  (39%).  About 80% of the married mothers who worked
full time also worked a full year.  Overall, 62%  of working women worked
50-52 weeks, while 18%  worked 27-49  weeks, and 20%  worked less  than half a
year (Stipp, 1988).  Single mothers who had never been married were the
76least likely to work full time  (29%),  mostly because  they lacked the
education and skills or child care support to do so  (Noble, 1986;  Rich
1986).  Even though all employed women were not in the work place full-
time, full-year, their increased participation in the labor force has
dramatically altered the lifestyle,  income, consumption needs, spending
habits and use of time in the American household.
In addition to their primary job away from home, 5.8%  of employed men
and 4.6% of employed women report holding multiple jobs,  spending an
average of 13 hours a week on a second job.  Those most likely to  hold a
second job were between the ages of  25 and 44;  they worked over 53  hours a
week outside the home  (USDC, Statistical Abstract-1988,  1987).  On
average, however, employed married men worked 9.5 hours a day and employed
married women worked 6.5 hours per week in the labor force, for a ratio  of
women's to men's hours of  .68--a ratio that is  strikingly similar  to the
ratio  of women's to men's earnings  (Berk, 1985).
Meanwhile, over  the past three decades, time spent in household tasks
declined for women (27  to 19.5 hours per week).  and increased for men (4.6
to  9.8 hours per week).  The  ratio of women's to men's time  in household
tasks has declined from 6:1 in 1965  to 2:1 in 1985, according to a New
York Times nationwide survey  (St.  Paul Pioneer Press, 1988).  Using
aggregate rather than a survey data, Fuchs  (1986) found that women's
household time fell less  (from 32  to  28 hours per week between 1959 and
1983),  and men's household time increased less  (from 11.5  to 12 hours per
week),  than the above survey suggests.
Adding household time to the labor force time, married, employed men
worked between 57  and 64 hours per week and married, employed women
77TABLE 3.6  MEN'S LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE BY AGE GROUP
AND MARITAL STATUS, 1960-1988  (PERCENT)
16-19  20-24  25-44  45-64  Over 65
1960
Married  96.0  97.5  98.5  93.0  37.1
Single  34.4  76.6  85.3  74.4  24.3
Widowed/Divorced  N/A  88.6  83.0  78.1  18.2
1970
Married  95.5  95.0  98.2  91.6  30.2
Single  49.0  69.0  84.2  66.6  21.0
Widowed/Divorced  N/A  73.2  77.6  75.9  16.5
1980
Married  97.3  96.8  97.3  84.8  20.4
Single  56.8  79.6  83.6  65.2  20.0
Widowed/Divorced  N/A  92.9  92.4  69.9  13.0
1988
Married  95.3  95.7  96.8  82.8  17.5
Single  49.7  80.1  86.9  65.7  20.7
Widowed/Divorced  N/A  93.2  90.3  71.2  11.6
Source:  U.S. Statistical Abstract 1988,  1989
78TABLE 3.7  WOMEN'S LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES
BY AGE GROUP AND MARITAL STATUS,
1960-1988  (PERCENT)
16-19  20-24  25-44  45-64  Over 65
1960
Married  25.3  30.0  40.0  34.2  5.9
Single  25.3  73.4  79.8  75.1  21.6
Widowed/Divorced  37.3  54.6  61.5  58.3  11.6
1970
Married  36.0  47.4  43.3  44.1  7.9
Single  39.5  71.1  77.0  67.8  17.6
Widowed/Divorced  46.5  59.7  66.4  60.7  9.9
1980
Married  47.7  60.5  60.9  46.9  7.2
Single  49.0  72.2  81.4  62.8  12.0
Widowed/Divorced  51.0  68.5  76.8  59.5  8.6
1988
Married  46.8  65.9  70.7  52.7  7.4
Single  48.7  74.8  81.6  65.2  10.9
Widowed/Divorced  64.5  67.7  78.9  62.6  8.2
Source:  Bureau of Labor Statistics,  1986
U.S.  Statistical Abstract  1988,  1989
79TABLE 3.8  LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES OF MARRIED WOMEN,
HUSBAND PRESENT, BY  PRESENCE  AND AGE
OF  CHILDREN, 1950-1988
With no
children  With children under 18 vrs:
Year  Total  under 18  Total  6-17incl.  Under 6
1950  23.8  30.3  18.4  28.3  11.9
1955  27.7  32.7  24.0  34.7  16.2
1960  30.5  34.7  27.6  39.0  18.6
1965  34.7  38.3  32.2  42.7  23.3
1970  40.8  42.2  39.7  49.2  30.3
1975  44.4  43.8  44.9  52.2  36.7
1980  50.1  46.0  54.1  61.7  45.1
1988  56.8  48.9  65.6  73.0  56.8
Source:  Bureau of Labor Statistics,  1986
U.S.  Statistical Abstract  1988,  1989.
Note:
Children are  defined as never-married sons and daughters,  stepchildren and
adopted children.  Excluded are other related children such as grandchildren,
nieces, nephews and cousins, and unrelated children.
80worked between 49.5 and 61 hours per week on average.  The ratio of
women's to men's total work time was between  .85 and  .95.  Clearly, there
is wide variation around these average numbers, with parents of
smallchildren working considerably more hours than those without children.
This gives rise  to conflicting stories about whether Americans are
gaining or loosing leisure time and whether or not they are better off or
more stressed than ever.  The fact is,  the large number of families
between the ages  of 25  and 50 have more working members  than ever.
Families with two working spouses and small children have  time demands
unlike those  that were ever known when women stayed at home and/or
extended families were available to take care of children and run errands.
By 1988,  60%  of married couples had both spouses employed, and two-thirds
of them had children at home.  As the baby boom generation moves through
ages 25 to  50, many families will not feel like their leisure  time is
increasing.
While  17.8 million married couple families with children and working
mothers  (27%  of all  families and 19%  of all households) cope with
extraordinary time demands, others are gaining leisure time  (Townsend &
Riche, 1987).  Factors that lead to an increase  in leisure  time are a
decrease in the number of children in households, longer portions of lives
spent unmarried and earlier retirements.  Between 1965 and 1975, young men
and elderly men and women gained significant hours of leisure,  as did
middle-aged women  (Robinson, 1989).  Leisure, as defined here, is  time
spent after taking care of all work tasks and personal grooming and
sleeping.  It  includes time spent  in school, taking part in clubs and
organizations,  sports, recreational activities, hobbies, TV, reading, and
81visiting with friends and relatives.
On average, women gained 5 hours of leisure per day since  1965,
leaving them with 39 hours per week by 1985.  Men had 40 hours per week in
both time periods.  Men and women age 36-50 had the least leisure  time,
about 34.5 hours per week.  On average, married men and women each had 37
hours, decreasing to  31  if there was a child under age  five  in the home.
Single men and women had the most leisure time, 48 and 43 hours each.  Men
without children had 12 more leisure hours per week than those with
preschoolers; women without children had 7 hours more (Robinson, 1989).
In almost all cases in the  past three decades, women had less leisure
time than men.  One  exception was  in recent times, when there were
preschool children present, or women were age 36-50--those ages when
children are most likely to be present.  In these two circumstances,
women's leisure was slightly greater than for men, indicating that some
child care activities  shifted to  fathers.  It may also  reflect the
greater number of hours men of this age spend in the labor force.  The
greatest gains in leisure were by  the elderly  (22%  or 8-9 hours per week)
and, on average,  for women (15%  or 5.5 hours per week) (Robinson, 1989).
The former  is due  to  earlier retirement, and the latter  is due  to fewer
children, shifting some child care to fathers, remaining single more of
one's life, and finding more efficient ways  to  conduct household tasks.
Since 1982,  the proportion of women aged 18  to 44 who had no children
remained 38%  (USDC, CB86-100).  The proportion among 25-29 year old women
increased from 31%  in 1976,  to 41%  in 1988.  The proportion among women
age  30-34 increased from 16%  to 25%.  Women most likely to be child-free
were white, college educated and in professional occupations  (Wall Street
82Journal, February 4, 1988).  Among married couples where both spouses had
a college education, 70%  are dual-earner households.  Thirty-six percent
of these highly-educated, dual-earners had no children in 1987.  This
compares  to  58%  of all married couples who are dual-earners, only 20%  of
whom had no children (USCD, CB88-102,  1988).  Among women age 30  to  39
who earned over $25,000 a year in 1983, half had no children in their
homes  (Fuchs).
Increased education and incomes have increased the value of women's
time and have resulted in fewer children and new ways  to  substitute
capital'for labor  in housework.  Only by decreasing their hours in the
household have women been able to keep their total work time within the
constraints of a 24 hour day and meet normal sleep and personal care
requirements.  Although household tasks have not shifted significantly
from wives  to husbands, looking for ways to be more efficient and cut down
on household time has become a quest for men and women alike.
One of the primary ways of cutting household time has been to spend
less  time in the kitchen (Burros, 1988).  Microwave ovens, found in 81%
of homes with income over $35,000  (in 1988) have helped.  So have
convenience foods,  take out food, fast food, and home delivered food.
Since 86%  of employed women still do most of the cooking and 91%  do  the
shopping, they are  looking for ways to feed themselves and their families
quickly.  Most spend less than a half hour preparing an evening meal;  20%
spend less  than 15 minutes  (Burros, 1988).
Increased labor force participation on the part of women has
instigated massive changes  in the way consumers  shop, eat and cook.  Even
though they demand healthy and nutritious food, convenience is a powerful
83need.  One study shows that, among married couples under age  55 with two
earners,  almost 40%  of food expenditures were for food away from home
(restaurant or take out food), while among married couples where the wife
was not in the labor force, only 24%  to  30%  of food expenditures were for
food away from home  (Waldrop, August 1989).  Since total  food expenditures
were quite similar between the two groups,  the higher  incomes and scarcer
time of the dual earners lead them to  select more food that is prepared
somewhere besides  in the home.
Earlier research showed, however, that a greater proportion of
increased earnings went for food away from home when the wife worked part
time,  than if she worked full time  (Kinsey, 1983).  This  indicates that
the  time constraints on full-time working wives leads them to  either
purchase less expensive food away from home  (fast food or take out food)
or  to eat out less often.
If, however, leisure continues  to increase,  the demand for restaurant
meals could increase.  It was reportedly the number one  choice for leisure
time activities  in 1989  (Cox, 1989).  Another recent survey found that
those who spent the most time eating meals away from home were older
people, college graduates, unmarried people,  and those with incomes
between $25,000 and $35,000  (McAdams, 1987).  This  is  all consistent with
those groups who have the most leisure time.  The elderly are experiencing
more leisure  time and their numbers  are growing rapidly.  Rather than
looking for ways to be more efficient, they are seeking activities  that
have a more  leisurely pace.  Restaurant eating is  one such activity.
Those whose  incomes  are not particularly high have lower valued time,  and
can eat more frequently and leisurely in restaurants.  College graduates,
84on average, marry later and have fewer children.  They need less time  for
household tasks.  They can eat out more often because they have both more
time and more money than others.
Labor force participation determines the productivity of individual
households, businesses, government services, and the nation.  It also
determines household income and its  distribution.  It  therefore
determines the spending power and life style of households and, to  a large
extent, the  types of food they eat.  More employed people means more
spending power.  Though rising incomes do not mean a proportional increase
in food expenditures,  they do increase the demand for variety, high
quality and convenience.  As households become affluent, they pay less
attention to food prices and more attention to  quality characteristics.
They become more concerned about the subtleties  of their diet than the
quantity of food.
In contrast, there were 2.5 million families with cash incomes of
less than $5000 in 1988.  Their average family size was 3 persons, half
were black or Hispanic and two-thirds were headed by a female  (Wall Street
Journal, November 17,  1989).  They need inexpensive, nutritious food
sauces and increasingly rely on government programs for  income and food.
Diversity is  the key to  food marketing.  Although everyone needs food
to eat, ideas about what type of food is  good, healthy, or affordable vary
all over  the map.  New tastes are discovered as  people move about, new
technology allows new forms of food to be delivered, new information
turns good food into bad food (and visa versa),  and a variety of
lifestyles calls  for an increasing potpourri of food presentation and
delivery.
85FINAL COMMENTS
Foretelling future changes  in food consumption may be as much an art
as a  science, but Smallwood and Blaylock (1986) applied sound scientific
methods to projecting the combined effects of demographic changes  and real
income growth on future changes  in food expenditures.  Projections for
changes  involving different rates of population, and income growth can be
found in their publication, but those reproduced here are  for the middle
level of population growth, and a 1% growth rate  in real  income.  This
combination was chosen, even though since about 1940,  real  incomes grew
around 2" per year.  Since 1980, declining productivity and wage
stagnation resulted in real income growth of closer to  1%,  and this
stagnation seems  to persist.  For example, after tax household  income
increased an average  of 1.3% per year between 1980 and 1986;  median
household pretax income  increased at a rate of 0.06%, and median family
income declined at a rate of 1.4%  (USDC, Statistical Abstract-1988,  1989).
Future income growth is  expected to  slow or stagnate and will probably be
closer to  1%.  It will become less  important relative to demographic
changes.
Table 3.9  shows Smallwood and Blaylock's  (1986) projected per capita
and total national changes in real food expenditures for various food
categories in 2010 as  a percent of expenditures  in 1980.  The projected
increases are greatest for food away from home  (16.5%),  alcoholic
beverages  (14.7%),  fish  (18.4%), and fruits and vegetables  (13 and 14%).
At the national  level, expenditures projected to increase more than 30%
for specific foodstuffs are  for pork, fish, fresh fruits, fresh and
processed vegetables and alcoholic beverages.  Although income effects
86TABLE 3.9  PROJECTED INCREASE IN REAL FOOD EXPENDITURES DUE TO THE
COMBINED DEMOGRAPHIC AND INCOME CHANGES
BETWEEN 1980 AND 2010a
Per Capita  National
Effect  Effect
Total Food  113.7  132.1
Food away from home  116.5  135.0
Food at home  110.8  128.9
Meat, poultry, fish and eggs  112.5  131.1
Beef  111.2  129.2
Pork  112.3  131.3
Other meat  106.9  124.3
Poultry  110.7  129.1
Fish  118.4  137.4
Eggs  105.3  122.4
Cereals  and bakery products  107.5  124.7
Dairy products  106.0  122.9
Milk and cream  101.5  117.2
Cheese  111.0  129.2
Other dairy products  109.6  126.8
Fruits  113.0  131.2
Fresh  113.8  132.2
Processed  111.7  129.4
Vegetables  114.2  133.1
Fresh  115.1  134.5
Processed  112.0  130.2
Sugars and sweeteners  107.2  123.8
Nonalcoholic beverages  107.4  125.3
Fats and oils  110.4  128.4
Butter  111.6  128.9
Margarine  109.4  127.4
Other  108.9  126.6
Miscellaneous  108.7  125.6
Alcoholic Beverages  114.7  133.2
a The  "middle-series" population projection of the Census Bureau, which projected
a U.S.  population of 283 million by 2010, was used.  An average  annual growth
rate of  1 percent was assumed for  real income  growth.  In addition to  population
and  income growth, the projections reflect the effect of changes  in the  age,
regional, and social distribution of the population.
SOURCE:  Blaylock and Smallwood, 1986,  pp.  36 and 41.
87tend to  dominate these results,  they are a good indication of
expenditures for one  type of  food relative  to another.  For example,
expenditure on dairy products is projected to  increase less than most
other foods,  except for cheese, and expenditures for fresh produce will
outstrip  that on processed fruits and vegetables.  The study also points
out that  the most important demographic changes are a decline  in the rate
of population growth and aging.  Increases in the elderly would increase
expenditures on all  types of food except food away from home and alcoholic
beverages.  Regional impacts were minor, but they would increase
expenditures on fresh fruits and vegetables, fats and oils,  and
miscellaneous foods, while decreasing expenditures on meats, cereals and
butter.  Ethnic  impacts were also minor, but tended to  decrease  overall
food expenditures.  Income effects were projected to  increase expenditures
on all foodstuffs  except eggs.  The largest expenditure increases due to
income were  for fish, cheese and alcoholic beverages.
Demographic trends will have an increasingly important impact on
food markets.  Most of them can be predicted accurately for 10  to  20 years
hence.  It  is  almost impossible  to be accurate  farther into the future,
since  the past does not always predict the future very well.  It is  also
difficult with demographics, as well as  economics,  to separate
irreversible  trends from cyclical and episodic events.  Among the
phenomena discussed in this paper, there are some of each.  Which are
truly trends?  With great trepidation, three are identified as  trends
likely to  last for the next 20 years:  1) increasing average levels of
education, 2) increasing ethnic diversity and 3) continued slow rates of
population growth.
88Other phenomena such as  the increasing percentage of women in the
labor market, a population shift to  the Southwest, declining mortality,
increased immigration, increased divorce rates and a decline in the
number of children among college educated people will likely stabilize at
different levels  than in the past, but their rates of change must slow.
When a saturation level is reached, an apparent  trend must either level
out or reverse.  This does not mean that permanent changes  in food
markets are not taking place.  Rather, that changes will continue to take
place and that catching the episodes and identifying the trends will
continue to be critical for successful food marketing.
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